Thomas Nagel on the nature of moral progress: [law.nyu.edu]
His theory of moral realism is interesting to me. I have tended to be a little skeptical of accounts of realism (especially in the Platonic sense) but his version seems like it might be useful. It's realist in the sense of positing that moral reasons can be objectively correct or incorrect, but relativist in the sense that the correctness of moral reasons is inherently grounded in a specific historical/cultural context.
He then applies this version of moral realism to questions of whether or not societies/cultures can be said to have progressed morally.
1
Enjoy being online again!
Welcome to the community of good people who base their values on evidence and appreciate civil discourse - the social network you will enjoy.Create your free account
1 comment
Feel free to reply to any comment by clicking the "Reply" button.Hum, I'll need to read it again. Nagel is a great thinker, but I'm not sure I agree with all that he is saying in this brief essay.
For instance he says that:
"The offense of harassment is not merely an interpersonal transgression but a form of social injustice."
and he goes on to say that is only true of women's harassment by men. He does not disregard the fact that men harass men, women/women & women/men but he thinks only men's harassment of women deserves institutional sanction, that the other forms of harassment require interpersonal sanction, that " ...they are not part of a pervasive problem of social justice". Which kinda goes along with his idea of moral progress, where men's systematic mistreatment of women is now recognized as not socially just.
He goes on to state:
"I believe that for this reason the institutional reactions to the cases of Kevin Spacey and James Levine
were completely disproportionate—motivated by a punitive spirit toward sexual transgression that has nothing to do with social justice"
cava
Level 7
Dec 12, 2018
0
Could you elaborate on what you disagree with in those?
To be clear, I'm sure I won't agree with all of Nagel's opinions on specific topics like whether or not institutional reactions to the Spacey case were proportionate or not (and I'd have to spend some time even to be entirely clear on what happened in specific cases).
I do think there is probably a useful analytical distinction between moral violations which contribute to larger systemic/institutional issues of justice (like those involving gender or race) and ones which do not, but I'm not sure recognizing the distinction should lead necessarily to having different institutional standards of conduct or different enforcement processes.
It does seem to me that his discussion of the issue is also more intended to support the point that some of these considerations wouldn't even make sense (the reasons could not seem like actual reasons) outside of contemporary society, re: the larger discussion about moral realism and progress.
cava:
@lovemuffin
I think all forms of sexual harassment, regardless of the genders involved are acts of social injustice and ought to be judged on that basis. Not by trying to genderize harassment. I think he is suggesting a political correctness styled solution, in what he describes as "interpersonal transgression"
Enjoy being online again!
Welcome to the community of good people who base their values on evidence and appreciate civil discourse - the social network you will enjoy.Create your free account
Share this post
Categories
Agnostic does not evaluate or guarantee the accuracy of any content. Read full disclaimer.