Knowledge:

As I mention in my text “Believing veraciously” (cf. links provided at my post on April, 11th 2018 ) according to my opinion the usage of “knowledge” in the strictest sense of word is completely uncontroversial only, when it is used in the context of present personal sensual experiences, thoughts etc. even though they might be illusionary or wrong (cf. discussions about the so-called Gettier problem). This is our absolutely noncontentious participation in truth as it is true that we experience our life in the way we do, although a “Cartesian demon” may deceive us in everything else.

I actually outpace Descartes by criticizing him for postulating “I think, therefore I am”, because he didn’t use this proposition in a merely performative sense but tried to deduce a substantial “ego” from it, although already the Buddha had exposed that undoubtedly there are sensual experiences, thoughts, recollections and so on, but an “I” is not graspable. Not necessarily but possibly (!!!) our “I” is just something that is occurring, a process or event not a substantial thing.

But, if even our inner life might be delusive, all the more the phenomenal outer world could be, as already noticed the old Taoist Zhuang Zhou. Of course for pragmatic reason we must adopt certain hypotheses about reality for the time being, but we should never forget about their impermanence and fallibility. (This constitutes an important difference between science and religion.) So these hypotheses always form a sort of belief

Socrates purportedly said, “I know that I know nothing.” (A closer translation of the original Greek citation would be, “I know that I do not know.&rdquo However this statement looks a little bit self-contradictory. So I prefer to state, “I believe that epistemologically considered in the end I almost know nothing but have to believe as cautiously and veraciously as possible.” This statement based on my life’s experience is a belief itself, but it doesn’t constitute a logical inconsistency.

My philosophy follows up Popper, though I heavily criticize him for his disrespect of inevitably induction based conclusions from empirical data and his untenably exaggerated deductive purism. However, in my opinion any naïve positivistic theory would be an inexcusable relapse in comparison to his merits.

If atheists would take Occam’s razor seriously to the same extend, which they demand from religious people, they would also have to refrain from ontological or other metaphysical assumptions about the fundaments of reality behind the phenomenal world in form of an ideological naturalism. But I agree that Occam’s rule is just a pragmatic recommendation for a lean functional design of theories in everyday business of science. Therefore e. g. Hitchens has to be blamed sharply for misusing it in the context of speculations beyond practical explanations of empirical issues.

In contrast to this Russell’s analogy with the famous celestial teapot justifiably exposes the problem, who is in charge of showing evidence for a certain concrete claim, which momentarily neither can be disproved nor verified.

OK, if I allege that there is a spaghetti monster, it is my task to bring arguments, why others should believe that. But be careful. If someone claims that there are no hidden supernatural things or beings at all, this person has to defend that assertion too. It makes a difference, whether one asserts that an arbitrary concrete scenario has to be considered as a serious option without any cogent evidence, or whether someone warns not to neglect completely a vast number of alternatives to an unproven world-view like naturalism.

The history of science show, how problematic metaphysical models can be, as for instance the formerly widespread materialism based on 19th century physics. Even famous scientists of that time would have rejected many concepts of today’s modern physics as arrant nonsense, if somebody suggested them without having the technical capabilities to substantiate them. We should be more cautious, because of the paradigm shifts in the past.

The reason for advocating a rationally defensible comprehensive agnosticism is that not only religious fundamentalists are endangering our open democratic society but also people, who seemingly do not feel responsible enough and are perhaps a little bit too sure that there is no afterlife, rebirth or whatever. Of course it is not possible to deduce concrete commandments from agnosticism, but acknowledging the given existential uncertainty, may fortify mindfulness and sensibility in the area of ethical questions. So I am continuing the tradition of Kant, who wanted to fortify ethics by postulates of practical reason, but in contrast to him I do not sacrifice the integrity of veracity for this purpose.